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THE PARIAH PRINCIPLE
Daniel Farber* and Suzanna Sherry**
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Romer v. Evansl has
caused both joy and consternation. Among legal scholars, however, it has mostly engendered puzzlement. The Court explicitly
avoided the most doctrinally plausible grounds for invalidating
Colorado's ban on anti-discrimination protections for homosexuals. Instead it purported to strike down the state constitutional
amendment under minimal scrutiny or rational basis review. The
word on the street-or, in the case of lawyers and law professors,
the word on the internet-is that Romer cannot mean what it
says, but instead must be a way-station to declaring homosexuality a quasi-suspect classification like gender or illegitimacy. The
speculation is that the Court will eventually use Romer to strike
down prohibitions on same-sex marriages and other restrictions
on gay rights.
We believe this line of reasoning gives the Romer majority
too little credit for intellectual honesty, if perhaps too much
credit for progressive impulses.z In this essay, we suggest that
the decision in Romer means no more and no less than what it
says (or at least tries to say): that Colorado's Amendment 2 is
invalid regardless of the level of judicial scrutiny. Moreover, we
contend that this conclusion does not significantly expand current law but is instead perfectly justifiable under existing precedent. The decision also does not necessarily threaten most other
restrictions on homosexuals, including bans on same-sex
marriage.
We will begin by exploring the seemingly perplexing failure
of the Romer Court to invoke some familiar doctrinal support.
* Henry J. Fletcher Professor of Law, Associate Dean of Faculty. and Acting As·
sociate Vice President for Academic Affairs, University of Minnesota.
** Earl R. Larson Professor of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Law, University of
Minnesota. We would like to thank Akhil Amar, Jim Chen, Paul Edelman, Phil Frickey,
and Barry Friedman for their helpful comments. Kaitlin Hallett provided invaluable re·
search assistance.
1. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
2. Given the overall tenor of the current Court, it hardly seems plausible that the
Justices are about to launch a new crusade for social justice on behalf of the
downtrodden.
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We will then attempt to articulate the principle we believe underlies Romer but is imperfectly explained in the opinion. This principle, in a nutshell, forbids the government from designating any
societal group as untouchable, regardless of whether the group in
question is generally entitled to some special degree of judicial
protection, like blacks, or to no special protection, like leftbanders (or, under current doctrine, homosexuals). We believe
this principle is firmly rooted in existing constitutional law. Finally, we consider the difficulties of applying this principle to
Amendment 2 and other legislation. We hope at least to persuade the reader that, contrary to the views of the dissenters and
of many commentators, Justice Kennedy's opinion in Romer
makes an intellectually respectable argument.
I. THE ROADS NOT TAKEN
In 1992, Colorado voters ratified an amendment to the state
constitution that effectively prohibited the state or any of its subdivisions from enacting laws that protect homosexuals from discrimination.3 The Colorado Supreme Court ultimately enjoined
the state from enforcing the provision (Amendment 2), and the
United States Supreme Court affirmed in Romer. At first blush,
there seem to be three plausible arguments for invalidating
Amendment 2. First, it might deprive homosexuals of a fundamental right, thus triggering (and failing) strict scrutiny under the
equal protection clause. This, in fact, was the basis for the Colorado court's decision. Second, it might be directed at a discrete
and insular minority, again triggering some form of heightened
scrutiny under the equal protection clause. Although plaintiffs
made this argument, and many commentators support it, 4 none
3. Amendment 2 provided:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bisexual Orientation.
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor
any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall
enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships
shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of
persons to have or claim any minority status quota preferences, protected status
or claim of discrimination. This Section of the Constitution shall be in all respects self-executing.
The Colorado Supreme Court interpreted the Amendment to invalidate all existing
laws-including municipal ordinances, executive orders, and the like-prohibiting discrimination against gays and lesbians and to preclude any future such laws. E11ans 11.
Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1284-85 (1993).
4. See, e.g., Bobbi Berstein, Power, Prejudice, and the Right to Speak: Litigating
"Outness" Under the Equal Protection Clause, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 269 (1995); John Charles
Hayes, The Tradition of Prejudice Versus the Principle of Equality: Homosexuals and
Heightened Equal Protection Scrutiny After Bowers v. Hardwick, 31 B.C. L. Rev. 375
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of the various courts in the Romer litigation accepted it. Finally,
the Supreme Court might have relied on cases that apply a somewhat stricter form of minimal scrutiny, sometimes called "rational basis with teeth." In fact, the Court did none of these
things.
The Colorado Supreme Court held that Amendment 2 deprived homosexuals of "the right to participate equally in the
political process."s Applying strict scrutiny to the deprivation of
this fundamental right, the court concluded that it was unsupported by a sufficiently compelling governmental interest. 6 In
holding that "the right to participate equally in the political process" is a fundamental right, the Colorado court relied partly on
voting rights cases, but primarily on cases which it said "bore a
much closer resemblance to the question presented by Amendment 2."7 According to the Colorado court, these cases, including
Reitman v. Mulkey,s Hunter v. Erickson,9 and Washington v. Seattle School District No. J,w stand for the broad proposition that a
'"[s]tate may no more disadvantage any particular group by making it more difficult to enact legislation [on] its behalf than it may
dilute any person's vote or give any group smaller representation
than another of comparable size. "'11 The United States Supreme
Court explicitly disavowed this rationale, noting that it was affirming "on a rationale different from that adopted by the state
supreme court. "12
The Colorado court itself rejected another potential basis for
applying heightened scrutiny to Amendment 2. Plaintiffs had
contended that homosexuals should be considered a suspect or
quasi-suspect class, thus subjecting Amendment 2 to strict or intermediate scrutiny. The trial court rejected this argument, and
the Colorado Supreme Court explicitly refused to consider it.J3
(1990); Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex
Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 197 (1994); Eric A. Roberts, Heightened Scrutiny
Under the Equal Protection Clause: A Remedy to Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation, 42 Drake L. Rev. 485 (1993).
5. 854 P.2d at 1285.
6. The court first reached these conclusions in upholding the trial court's grant of a
preliminary injunction against enforcement of Amendment 2. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d
1270 (Colo. 1993) (Evans !). It later reaffirmed the same conclusions in affirming the
issuance of a permanent injunction. Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994) (Evans

II).
7. 854 P.2d at 1279.
8. 387 u.s. 369 (1967).
9. 393 u.s. 385 (1969).
10. 458 u.s. 457 (1982).
II. 854 P.2d at 1283, quoting Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385,389 (1969).
12. 116 S. Ct. at 1624.
13. 882 P.2d 1335, 1341 n.3 (Colo. 1994).
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The United States Supreme Court also ignored this argument,
reviewing the Amendment under the standard applying to legislation that "neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a
suspect class. "14
Finally, the Supreme Court might have relied on the approach taken in a pair of cases from the 1980s. In each case, the
Court had purported to apply minimal scrutiny to a statute that
neither burdened a fundamental right nor targeted a suspect
class, but it nevertheless invalidated the challenged law after a
close examination of its purposes and effects. In Plyler v. Doe,1s
Texas had attempted to prohibit illegal alien children from attending public schools. The Supreme Court, after holding that
illegal alien children do not constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect
class and that education is not a fundamental right, rejected
every justification for the law offered by the state. In City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,16 the city of Cleburne (also
in Texas) had zoned a group home for the mentally-disabled out
of a residential neighborhood. Again, after explicitly concluding
that the rational basis test provided the appropriate level of scrutiny, the Court struck down the zoning restriction. Given the
Court's rather cavalier rejection of the plausible governmental
interests behind these two laws, it is difficult to reconcile the two
cases with ordinary applications of the rational basis test. Indeed, commentators have generally viewed these two cases as evidence of a fourth tier of scrutiny under the equal protection
clause, sometimes labeled "rational basis with teeth. " 17
Although these cases might thus have provided support for invalidating Amendment 2 using minimal scrutiny, the Romer opinion
did not cite either one. Instead, the Court relied on hoary cases
embodying weak formulations of the rational basis test, including
FS. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia,IB Williamson v. Lee Optical
of Oklahoma, Inc.,19 and Railway Express Agency v. New York. 20
The Court apparently believed that Amendment 2 failed to satisfy even the most minimal scrutiny.
14. 116 S. Ct. at 1627.
15. 457 u.s. 202 (1982).
16. 473 u.s. 432 (1985).
17. David 0. Stewart. Supreme Court Report: A Growing Equal Proceccion Clause?,
71 A.B.A. J. 108,112 (Oct. 1985) (quoting Victor Rosenblum); see also Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Racional Basis Wich Bice: Incermediace Scruciny by Any Ocher Name, 62 Ind. L.J. 779
(1987). Although the Court did not cite these cases, it did cite a later case limiting them,
Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637 (1993).
18. 253 u.s. 412 (1920).
19. 348 u.s. 483 (1955).
20. 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
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The Court also declined the invitation to apply a literal reading of the equal protection clause to Amendment 2. At oral argument, the suggestion had been made that Amendment 2
deprived homosexuals of any right to legal protection, even
under laws of general application such as the assault statutes. 21
Given the lack of any textual basis in Amendment 2 for this interpretation, the Court wisely eschewed this analysis. Nor did
the Court follow the suggestion, made in an amicus brief filed by
some leading constitutional scholars, that Amendment 2
amounted to a form of outlawry. Their premise was that the
equal protection clause "requires a regime that gives all persons
equal access at least to the possibility of protection under the
laws of the state from the wrongs that may befall them-whether
such wrongs as robbery or such wrongs as discrimination, and
whether privately or officially inflicted. "22 Apart from one passing remark,23 however, the Court did not explicitly endorse this
line of analysis any more than it did a heightened level of
scrutiny.
21. See 116 S. Ct. at 1630.
22. Brief of Laurence H. Tribe, John Hart Ely, Gerald Gunther, Philip B. Kurland,
and Kathleen M. Sullivan, as amici curiae in support of respondents. The principle that
the government may not create a class of outlaws seems sound. See Gerald L. Neuman,
Aliens as Outlaws: GovernmenT Services, Proposition /87, and the Structure of Equal Protection Doctrine, 42 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1425, 1440-42 (1995). Surely, however, the status of
outlawry depends on the degree to which the laws actually protect a person's rights, not
on the degree to which he might be able to obtain future legislation protecting them. For
example, ordinary legislation that deprived a group of any protection from the criminal
law would surely create a state of outlawry, even though the group retained the right to
seek a repeal of the law. But the right to protection by anti-discrimination laws is clearly
not in the same class as the right to protection from criminal conduct-otherwise, every
group in America would have an inherent right to be made a "protected class"
immediately.
23. The Court does remark at one point that "[a] law declaring that in general it
shall be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from the
government is itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense." 116
S. Ct. at 1628 (emphasis added). This statement is probably correct if the kind of general
declaration to which the Court refers includes the ordinary protection of criminal and tort
law. For instance, a rule prohibiting 911 calls by homosexuals would surely violate equal
protection in some primal sense. On the other hand, it must clearly be true that the state
can selectively bar groups from some kinds of aid; the Court surely did not mean to
invalidate a state constitutional provision barring farm assistance, even though such a
provision makes it more difficult for farmers to obtain a form of government "aid."
Amendment 2 fell short of the kind of general declaration to which the Court seems to be
referring. It did not declare that "in general" it would be more difficult for homosexuals
to receive aid from the government than members of other groups; it only restricted a
specific type of aid.
Although the Court did not explicitly endorse the amicus briefs analysis, the brief
may well have contributed to the opinion by nudging the Court toward reconceptualizing
the case. Although the brief takes the idea in a different direction than the Court or our
own analysis does, it does put forward the view that Romer involved a kind of outcast
status.
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Hence the puzzlement of legal commentators. As we all
teach our students,24 the Court never invalidates statutes unless it
applies something more than "real" minimal scrutiny; it has not
done so, our lectures recite, since 1937. Indeed, both of the authors play the following game with students as part of the unit on
the rational basis test: "You think of a ridiculous statute and I
will give a sufficiently rational justification to withstand minimal
scrutiny." We have justified requiring cars to be painted blue (to
give a boost to the blue paint industry, or to make it easier to
identify emergency vehicles), allocating benefits based on astrological signs (perhaps there is something to the personality differences astrologers attribute to date of birth, or else division by
astrological sign is a convenient alternative to a lottery), and requiring all contracts to be written in Sanskrit (to foster education
and increase employment opportunities for linguists). We have
been stumped only once, when a student proposed the "Jim
Jones law": everyone in the United States has to drink deadly
poison at a particular tirne.2s So how could the Supreme Court
have invalidated a provision that three Justices considered eminently reasonable?
The Court's puzzling reliance on the rational basis test, while
eschewing seemingly more promising lines of argument, left it
vulnerable to a blistering dissent by Justice Scalia. Justice Scalia
argued that the rational basis test was easily met. If a state can
make homosexual conduct a crime, "surely it is constitutionally
permissible for a State to enact other laws merely disfavoring homosexual conduct. "26 Furthermore,
[A]ssuming that, in Amendment 2, a person of homosexual
"orientation" is someone who does not engage in homosexual
conduct but merely has a tendency or desire to do so, Bowers
still suffices to establish a rational basis for the provision. If it
is rational to criminalize the conduct, surely it is rational to
deny special favor and protection to those with a self-avowed
tendency or desire to engage in the conduct. Indeed, where
24. This is a variant on '"what every schoolchild knows," a somewhat suspect formulation. See PhilipP. Frickey, The Fool on the Hill: Congressional Findings, Constitutional
Adjudication, and United States v. Lopez, 46 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 695. 6% & n.10
( 1996). Nevertheless, the statement in the text appears to be uncontroverted.
25. One of us argued that the statute is rationally related to environmental protection because the elimination of the human population would reduce pollution and conserve natural resources. Students-and the other author-were not persuaded, however,
though this argument does seem sufficient to satisfy rational basis as it is usually articulated. (Note that this example really involves the use of the rational basis test under
substantive due process rather than equal protection: the hypothetical statute cannot be
faulted for failing to treat all groups equally.)
26. 116 S. Ct. at 1631 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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criminal sanctions are not involved, homosexual "orientation"
is an acceptable stand-in for homosexual conduct.27

Thus, Justice Scalia concluded, "[n]o principle set forth in the
Constitution, nor even any imagined by this Court in the past 200
years, prohibits what Colorado has done here. "2s Accusing the
majority of "heavy reliance upon principles of righteousness
rather than judicial holdings," Justice Scalia characterized the decision as an imposition of elite cultural values on the populace.29
If, as Justice Scalia so forcibly argues, the Romer opinion is
indefensible on its own terms, is there any explanation for the
opinion other than sheer lawlessness? One response, which has
already circulated among Court-watchers, is that Romer is a temporary ruling, which will eventually be replaced by a decision
recognizing sexual orientation as a quasi-suspect classification
subject to intermediate scrutiny. Adherents to this view have
some historical evidence on their side: both of the classifications
currently accorded intermediate scrutiny-gender and illegitimacy-were initially subject to exactly the sort of "heightened
minimal scrutiny" that the Court is said to have used in Romer.
In Reed v. Reed,Jo the Court purported to use minimal scrutiny to
invalidate a law preferring men over women in the choice of estate administrators. Under traditional minimal scrutiny, the administrative convenience of a rule preferring the gender more
likely to have had business experienceJJ should have been sufficient to justify the law. Five years later, the Court abandoned the
pretense of minimal scrutiny and declared gender discrimination
subject to intermediate scrutiny.32 The same pattern unfolded in
the illegitimacy cases, although over a longer period of time: after invalidating several laws discriminating against illegitimate
children or their parents under the rubric of minimal scrutiny,
the Court eventually determined that intermediate scrutiny
should apply.33
27. !d. at 1632 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 1633 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
29. !d. at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
30. 404 U.S. 71 ( 1971 ).
31. This assumption obviously was more valid in 1971, when the case was decided,
than it is today.
32. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). In the interim, four members of the Court
indicated their willingness to apply strict scrutiny to gender distinctions. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
33. See, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1%8) (statute invalidated under minimal scrutiny); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971) (statute upheld under minimal scrutiny); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (statute invalidated under minimal
scrutiny); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (statute upheld under minimal scrutiny);
Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988) (intermediate scrutiny applied).
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But using "rational basis with teeth" to predict the eventual
application of intermediate scrutiny does not always work. As
Plyler and Cleburne both show, the Court does not always take
the second step. It would be easier, of course, to fit Romer into
the latter pattern if the Court had cited Plyler or Cleburne. As it
is, viewing Romer as an example of "heightened minimal scrutiny" leaves open the question of which category it fits into. Is
Romer a way-station on the route to intermediate scrutiny or
does it instead establish yet another instance of "semi-quasi-suspect classification"?
This question arises only because of the premise that some
form of heightened scrutiny is necessary to justify the result. This
premise seems to be common ground between Justice Scalia's
dissent and Romer's supporters. Scalia assumed that because of
Hardwick v. Bowers, homosexuals as a class are entitled to no
special degree of constitutional protection, and thus that Romer
cannot be justified. Romer's supporters are likely to argue that
Romer amounts to a covert recognition that something more
than minimal judicial scrutiny is required in gay rights cases. We
would like to explore a third possibility: that the majority was
correct to invalidate the law without using heightened scrutiny.
We suggest that the result in Romer can be defended without
resolving any general questions about the degree of scrutiny for
laws affecting homosexuals. In other words, we contend that the
Court correctly concluded that every group-whether homosexuals, smokers, left-banders, or the overweight-is entitled to protection from certain kinds of legislation.
Our proposition requires rejection of Justice Scalia's apparent assumption that, if the state has the right to criminalize certain conduct, it necessarily has the unlimited right to promote
private discrimination against any group with a propensity to engage in that conduct. Rather, we believe, a distinction must be
drawn between the state's power to regulate conduct and its ability to designate groups as untouchable. Indeed, we believe that
this principle, once properly articulated, is firmly rooted in existing law-if not almost too obvious to be debatable. What is
less obvious is how to apply the principle, and it is for this reason
that Romer at first blush seems to require the assistance of some
extra level of judicial scrutiny. Properly understood, however,
Amendment 2 was not, as Justice Scalia would put it, an unexceptional effort to block a group from obtaining special privileges, but rather an effort to single out a group for pariah status.

PARIAH PRINCIPLE
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PARIAHS AND THE CONSTITUTION
A.

DEFINING THE pARIAH PRINCIPLE
I.

A 23-year-old woman had just given birth to her first
baby when she learned something devastating about her husband. He was secretly a burakumin, a descendant of outcasts.
So the woman refused to touch her own babv. She returned to
her parents' house and abandoned her husband and child
forever.J4
ii.
Tyranny of [the] caste system, experienced by him in his
early life is as follows: when he was only 5 years old, he learnt
that no barber would cut his hair for fear of pollution and so
this chore had to be done by his sister. Stranded with his sister
on the railway platform at Gurgaon, he found that no bullock
cart driver would take them. And when he found one cart, the
driver would not drive the cart, a job he had to do ... himself .
. . . Returning from England. with a Doctorate degree to serve
the Baroda state according to the terms of scholarship he
availed, Ambedkar found that no one was willing to rent a
house to him.35
No member of a Hindu caste may accept cooked food.
salt, milk or water from an untouchable. His touch is polluting.
even his nearness is often sufficient to defile a man of high
caste. In some cases even his sight is polluting. He is debarred
from using all public conveniences, roads. vehicles. ferries,
wells, schools, restaurants and tea shops.36
iii.
Cornelia Otis Skinner, the noted actress. found it virtually
impossible to obtain hotel reservations for herself and her
Negro maid during a 1948 tour of the segregated territory.
One Southern theatrical agent suggested that accommodation
might be more readily available if the maid would wear a
nurse's uniform. Only four hotels in the South would finally
take in both, and even these insisted that the two sleep in separate rooms, and that the maid use only the service elevator. ... Taxis would accept both, but if Miss Skinner went to
her hotel first, the maid would be dumped on the sidewalk and
34. Nicholas D. Kristof. Japan's Im·isible Minoriry: Beuer Off Than in Pas£, bw Srill
Owcasrs, N.Y. Times at A18 (Nov. 30, 1995).
35. W.C. Deb, Crime Against Humanity 67 (Uppal Publishing House, 1993).
36. Stephen Fuchs, At rhe Bottom of Indian Society: The Harijan and 01her Low
Castes 4 (Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, Pvt. Ltd., 1981 ).
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told to call a Negro cab for the remainder of the ride to a
Negro hotel.J7
Summer, 1965. Father, mother, brother, me. En route to
New York City, by way of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, Washington. D.C., and Annapolis. Maryland. First stop Annapolis,
late, tired from hours of driving, and hungry. Hotel, after hotel, after hoteL we find. Simply no room for a family like
mine ....
I could talk about how it felt to see my father go in and
out of those red and brown brick buildings, in the rain, wondering how they said what they said to him, but I've promised
myself not to get angry this trip.38
The state's table was placed at right angles to that of the
defense so that opposing counsel were almost face to face. The
weather was extremely warm that day and, although pitchers
of ice water and cups were placed on the judge's bench and on
the state's table, none was provided for the defense. Defense
counsel were told, however, that they might use a "for colored
only" fountain located outside the courtroom.39
Not only are Negro corpses commonly barred from burial
in white cemeteries; in the nation's capital a cemetery for pets
refuses to inter the remains of pets that were owned by
Negroes.40
What these passages have in common is that they describe
the daily indignities of social pariahs. Whether they are called
outcasts or untouchables or worse, pariahs are not simply the
group at the bottom of the social or economic ladder. To be a
pariah is to be shunned and isolated, to be treated as if one had a
loathsome and contagious disease. The message is that outcasts
are not merely inferior; they are not fully human, and contact
with them is dangerous and degrading.
That such a system once existed in this country will forever
be a source of shame; that it is now an anathema cannot be
doubted. If the equal protection clause means anything, it means
that the government cannot pass caste legislation: it cannot ere37. Stetson Kennedy, Jim Crow Guide: The Way It Was 194 (Florida Atlantic U.
Press, 1990).
38. Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Word and the River: Pedagogy as Scholarship as
Struggle, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 2231, 2279-80 (1992). See also Karen Fields, Introduction to
Mamie Garvin Fields, Lemon Swamp and Other Places: A Carolina Memoir xiii (The Free
Press, 1983).
39. Henry v. Williams, 299 F. Supp. 36, 41 (N.D. Miss. 1969)
40. Kennedy, Jim Crow Guide at 85 (cited in note 37). See also C. Vann Woodward,
The Strange Career of Jim Crow (Oxford U. Press, 1974); Neil R. McMillen, Dark Journey: Black Mississippians in the Age of Jim Crow (U. of Illinois Press, 1989).
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ate or sanction outcast groups. The Court has recognized that
when the government treats a group of citizens as pariahs, it imposes two unacceptable harms. It simultaneously brands them as
inferior and encourages others to ostracize them. Thus, in
Strauder v. West Virginia,41 the Court invalidated a law that prohibited blacks from sitting on juries on the ground that it was
"practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion
of their inferiority, and a stimulant to ... race prejudice. "42 Our
Constitution does not permit the government to declare "an
open season" on some group of citizens.43
Indeed, as Justice Harlan wrote in his justly lauded dissent in
Plessy v. Ferguson, "[t]here is no caste here."44 "We boast of the
freedom enjoyed by our people above all other peoples," he continued, "[b ]ut it is difficult to reconcile that boast with a state of
the law which, practically, puts the brand of servitude and degradation upon a large class of our fellow-citizens, our equals before
the law."4s Various Justices have reiterated his sentiment. Plyler, in which the Court struck down a mean-spirited attempt to
deprive illegal alien children of a public education, is only the
most recent example. In that case, the Court noted that "[t]he
Equal Protection Clause was intended to work nothing less than
the abolition of all caste-based ... legislation. "4o Caste legislation, wrote Justice Douglas in 1941, is "utterly incompatible with
the spirit of our system of government."47 The Court has noted
that the Constitution does not permit states to "divide citizens
into ... permanent classes."4s The Court has frequently quoted
Senator Howard, who defended the proposed Fourteenth
Amendment on the floor of the Senate by suggesting that its rna41. 100 u.s. 303 (1879).
42. !d. at 308.
43. See Glona v. American Guarantee & Liabili£y Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75 (1968)
(invalidating a law that "creates an open season on illegitimates in the area of automobile
accidents"). In extreme cases. an "open season" law would be equivalent to outlawry.
See supra note 22.
44. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, 1., dissenting).
45. !d. at 562.
46. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 213 (1982); see also id. at 217 n.14 (Texas statute
invalidated by the Court ·'suggests the kind of ·class or caste' treatment that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to abolish"). For other examples of condemnation of
caste, see, e.g. Ci£y of Cleburne 1'. Cleburne Living Cemer, 473 U.S. 432, 471-72 (1985)
(opinion of Marshall, 1.); Garner 1·. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 185 (1961) (Douglas, 1., concurring); Boddie v. ConneC£icU£, 401 U.S. 371, 385 (1971) (Douglas, 1., concurring);
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238. 255. 257 (1972) (Douglas, 1., concurring); Kadrmas v.
Dickinson Public Schools, 487 U.S. 450, 469 (1988) (Marshall, 1., dissenting).
47. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 181 (1941) (Douglas, 1., concurring).
48. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 64 (1982); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202.
234 (1982) (Blackmun, 1., concurring).

268

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 13:257

jor purpose was to "abolis[h] all class legislation .. and [do]
away with the injustice of subjecting one caste of persons to a
code not applicable to another."49
The Court has also endorsed the related notion that the government cannot impose disabilities on an individual who bears
no responsibility for his status. In invalidating laws discriminating
against illegitimate children, for example, the Court noted that
"imposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the
basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some
relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing."so In Plyler, too, the Court stressed the injustice of imposing "a lifetime
hardship on a discrete class of children not accountable for their
disabling status. ''sJ This principle goes beyond the criminal justice principle demanding individualized determinations of actual
wrongdoing before punishment is imposed. It is instead another
formulation of the anti-caste aspect of the equal protection
clause: the government cannot single out a whole group of people to brand them with inferior status.
The pariah principle is at its strongest when the individuals
so targeted are not responsible for their status, but it has force
even where the individual bears some responsibility. In the immediate aftermath of the Civil War, the Court invoked the bill of
attainder clause to strike down occupational disabilities imposed
on former Confederates. Cummings v. Missourisz held unconstitutional a provision of the Missouri Constitution that required an
oath regarding past loyalty as a precondition for several occupations, including the priesthood. The Court said the loyalty oath
sought "to reach the person, not the calling" and was intended as
punishment rather than a bona fide occupational qualification.s3
If it had been upheld, the Missouri constitutional provision
would have created a large caste of individuals barred from key
occupations because of their unworthiness. In Ex Parte Garland,s4 the Court applied the same rationale to invalidate a ban
on former Confederates practicing law in federal court. More
49. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong. 1st Sess. 2766 (1866). The Court has quoted Howard in
numerous cases. including Plyler L Doe. 457 U.S. 202,214-15 (1982);Jones v. Helms, 452
U.S. 412,424 n.23 (1981); Reynolds~·. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,600 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See also Adamson v. California. 332 U.S. 46,52 n.8 (1947) (quoting Senator Sumner
to effect that the Fourteenth Amendment abolished "oligarchy, aristocracy, caste, or monopoly with peculiar privileges and powers").
50. Weber ~·. Aerna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
51. 457 U.S. at 223.
52. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866).
53. ld. at 320.
54. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
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recently, the Court reaffirmed this broad approach to the bill of
attainder clause in United States v. Brown,ss in which the Court
struck a ban on the holding of union office by current or former
members of the Communist Party. In each of these cases, the
Court was unpersuaded that the occupational disability was a rational attempt to prevent future harm as opposed to a sanction
for past misconduct.
The trait in question in each of these cases was immutable,
in the sense that the relevant conduct was in the past and unchangeable.so On the other hand, the disability was imposed on
the basis of some actual past conduct, rather a presumed "orientation" toward misconduct. The broader principle would seem to
be that the function of legislation is to regulate future conduct
rather than to express moral judgments about past conduct or
character flaws. Indeed, the Court has gone so far as to hold that
any criminal punishment whatsoever for even such a serious defect as drug addiction would violate the cruel and unusual punishment clauseY Yet drug addiction is certainly something that
the state has every right to discourage. Likewise, as Justice
Scalia seems to have conceded, the state could not possibly
criminalize homosexual orientation (as opposed to homosexual
conduct). The bill of attainder cases suggest that the state similarly could not use occupational limitations as a means of expressing its disapproval of homosexual orientation or even of past
homosexual conduct.
Thus, the Court has recognized a broad principle in a wide
range of cases, including equal protection cases, bill of attainder
cases, and even cruel and unusual punishment cases. The principle is that the government cannot brand any group as unworthy
to participate in civil society. Even the most serious past misconduct-the Confederates were, after all, guilty of treasondoes not provide a basis for this kind of group sanction. Still less
can a group be deprived of civil equality based on immutable
characteristics such as sexual orientation. This principle is at the
heart of the Romer Court's declaration that Amendment 2 "has
the peculiar property of imposing a broad and undifferentiated
55. 381 U.S. 437 ( 1965). The application of the bill of attainder clause to Romer is
brilliantly argued in Akhil Reed Amar, Auainder and Amendment 2: Romer's Rightness
(forthcoming, Mich. L. Rev.).
56. For this reason. the bill of attainder clause normally does not apply when individuals have the ability to exit the targeted class. See Selective Service System v. MPIRG,
468 u.s. 841 (1984).
57. Robinson ~·. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
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disability on a single named group, an exceptional and ... invalid
form of legislation."ss
The Court has rarely invoked the pariah principle,s9 perhaps
because such legislation is rare. But there are some indications
that the majority in Romer v. Evans relied on the pariah principle
to invalidate Colorado's Amendment 2. Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court concluded that a state "cannot ... deem a class
of persons a stranger to its laws,"6o nor "make them unequal to
everyone else."6J He also suggested that it is "not within our
constitutional tradition" to enact laws "declaring that in general
it shall be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all
others to seek aid from the government."6z Animus and hostility
are not legitimate governmental motivations. Even Justice Scalia
did not seem to dispute that the equal protection clause might
embody the pariah principle; he simply denied that Amendment
58. 116 S. Ct. at 1627.
59. A computer search reveals that the word ·•caste" appears in 36 Supreme Court
cases. Aside from the ones cited earlier in this essay, the bulk of the citations are concurring or dissenting arguments that a particular piece of legislation-usually affirmative action-does or does not create a forbidden caste system. Each argument contains an
implicit recognition that legislation that does create a caste system is unconstitutional. See
Richmond ~·. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 527 (1989) ("a 'quota is ... a creator of
castes"') (Scalia, J., concurring); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2120
(1995) ("There is no moral or constitutional equivalence between a policy that is designed
to perpetuate a caste system and one that seeks to eradicate racial subordination.") (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2123 n.5 ("I would not find Justice Thomas' extreme proposition-that there is a moral and constitutional equivalence between an attempt to
subjugate and an attempt to redress the effects of a caste system ... -at all persuasive.")
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2498 (1995) (quoting Stevens'
dissent in Adarand) (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2506 (same) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting);
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 254 (1979) ("the racial quota is
nonetheless a creator of castes") (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416
U.S. 312,343 (1974) ("[a] segregated admissions process creates suggestions of stigma and
caste no less than a segregated classroom.") (Douglas. J., dissenting); U.S. v. Yaze/1, 382
U.S. 341, 361 (1966) (system of 'coverture' is an "archaic remnant of a primitive caste
system") (Black, J., dissenting); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226.287 (1964) ("denial of the
constitutional right of Negroes to access to places of public accommodation would perpetuate a caste system in the United States") (Goldberg, J., concurring); Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820,882 (1961) (requiring bar membership dues "has the mark of 'a lawyer
class or caste"') (Douglas, J., dissenting); Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485,504 (1877) (discussing whether "separation tended to deepen and perpetuate the odious distinction of
caste") (Clifford, J., concurring); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 91 (1872)
(discussing whether commercial regulation "makes a caste of [one class of persons] to
subserve the power, pride, avarice, vanity, or vengeance of others") (Field, J., dissenting).
There are also a few cases which quote the certificate of incorporation of the NAACP,
which states that one of the organization's principle objectives is to "eradicate caste." See
NAACP v. Overstreet, 384 U.S. 118, 120 n.2 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting); NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,451 n.* (1958); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516,526 (1960).
60. 116 S. Ct. at 1629.
61. !d.
62. !d. at 1628.
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2 constituted the sort of caste legislation that would violate the
principle.
B.

THE pARIAH PRINCIPLE AND OTHER APPROACHES TO
EQUAL PROTECTION

Not surprisingly, given its intuitive appeal, the pariah principle resonates with other constitutional theories pertaining to the
exclusion of minority groups. It is distinguishable from those
theories primarily by its sharper focus.
One approach to the problem of group exclusion focuses on
the stigma imposed on members of the "outgroup." The stigma
approach is exemplified by Justice O'Connor's "endorsement"
test in establishment clause cases.63 In Justice O'Connor's view,
the government can neither "send a message to nonadherents [to
a particular religion] that they are outsiders, not full members of
the political community,"64 nor "mak[e] adherence to religion
relevant to a person's standing in the political community. "tis
Whether or not this is an appropriate test for the religion
clauses,66 it is an apt description of caste legislation. Indeed, the
message sent by caste legislation is even stronger: all right-thinking people should avoid any contact with those the legislation
makes pariahs. Pariahs are outsiders not only to the political
community, but to the human community. The hostility expressed by pariah legislation is visceral and deep-seated, reflecting a view of the pariahs as contaminating-literally
untouchable.
The concept of stigma has also played a role in thinking
about equal protection. Most notably, the Supreme Court relied
on the stigmatizing effect of segregation as a reason for invalidating it in Brown v. Board of Education. Charles Lawrence has expanded the idea of stigma as part of a full-blown theory of antidiscrimination law. Lawrence argues that strict scrutiny should
apply when legislation operates to "shame and degrade a class of
persons by labeling it as inferior."67 Stigma causes two kinds of
harm: it inflicts psychological injury on its victims and signals in63. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,689-90 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring);
Wallace v. laffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69-70 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
64. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
65. laffree, 472 U.S. at 69 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
66. For criticism of the endorsement test in the religion context, see, e.g., Michael
W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 115, 147-57 (1992).
67. Charles R. Lawrence, The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317, 350 (1987).
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ferior status to others.68 Consequently, Lawrence calls on courts
to invalidate government actions that convey a "cultural meaning" of racial inferiority, such as the building of a wall between a
white and black community.69 Similarly, Kenneth Karst has articulated a principle of equality that "centers on those aspects of
equality that are most closely bound to the sense of self and the
sense of inclusion in a community."7o
These stigma-based theories have an obvious resemblance to
the pariah principle. The pariah principle is narrower, however.
Rather than addressing all government actions that may lead to
damaging feelings of exclusion, it is limited to the extreme form
of exclusion faced by untouchables. Moreover, although psychological impact may be a supporting rationale for the pariah principle, the principle is primarily focused on the victims' right to
participate in civil society rather than on their feelings of selfesteem.
In this respect, it is more closely allied with the views of the
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. During the Reconstruction period, political and legal theorists distinguished between
civil rights and social rights. The Fourteenth Amendment was in
large part an effort to assure a firm constitutional basis for the
1866 Civil Rights Act, which in turn was a response to the postCivil War black codes in the South. The black codes deprived
blacks of a variety of rights regarding employment, property
ownership, free movement, and participation in the legal system,
and the Civil Rights Act was meant to guarantee the right of
blacks to participate in civil society.7t Guarding the self-esteem
of blacks was a much lower priority. Although the pariah principle does not ignore psychological trauma or the handicaps on social interaction created by untouchable status, it gives equal
attention to the evil of what the Romer Court called "exclusion
from an almost limitless number of transactions and endeavors
that constitute ordinary civic life in a free society."n
Another approach to equal protection focuses on the
subordinate position of certain groups in society. This approach,
and its connection with the concept of caste, has been most ambi68. ld. at 351.
69. ld. at 355-56, 363-64.
70. Kenneth L. Karst, Belonging to America: Equal Citizenship and the Constitution
3 (Yale U. Press, 1989).
71. The history is recounted in Daniel A. Farber and Suzanna Sherry, A History of
the American Constitution 298-305 (West Publishing Co., 1990). See also Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 2410,2435-36 (1994) (black codes as paradigm denials of equal protection).
72. 116 S. Ct. at 1627.
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tiously developed by Cass Sunstein. Sunstein articulates his anticaste principle as follows:
[T]he anticaste principle forbids social and legal practices from
translating highly visible and morally irrelevant differences
into systemic social disadvantage, unless there is a very good
reason for society to do so. On this view, a special problem of
inequality arises when members of a group suffer from a range
of disadvantages because of a group-based characteristic that
is both visible for all to see and irrelevant from a moral point
of view. This form of inequality is likely to be unusually persistent and to extend into multiple social spheres, indeed into
the interstices of everyday Iife.73

In his terms, society's treatment of women and blacks violates
the anticaste principle; discrimination against Jews, homosexuals,
and the poor does not. 74
Sun stein's principle is both broader and narrower than the
pariah principle. It is broader in that the concept of caste is
wider than that of untouchability. Indeed, the Indian caste system predated the creation of untouchable castesJs Clearly, a
group may occupy a subordinate position without being untouchable-women, whom Sunstein consider to be a subordinate
caste, are the most obvious example. On the other hand, Sunstein's view is also narrower because he limits his definition of
caste to visible characteristics-a definition that might paradoxically exclude the Indian untouchable caste. More importantly,
Sunstein's approach is an effort to identify protected classes
whose low economic and political status deserves special solicitude, whereas the pariah principle protects any group from being
legislated into outcast status.
Sunstein's approach is an ambitious reconceptualization of
existing equal protection doctrine. Like his anticaste principle,
the conventional concept of suspect classes is related to the pariah principle but is nevertheless quite distinct.
One factor the Court considers in determining whether legislation is directed at a discrete and insular minority-a "suspect
classification" in equal protection parlance-is whether the trait
that identifies the target group is immutable.76 Thus race and
73. Sunstein, 92 Mich. L. Rev. at 2411-12 (cited in note 71).
74. Id. at 2438, 2444.
75. See Tirnur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification 200-01 (Harvard U. Press, 1995).
76. For an elaboration, see Suzanna Sherry, Selective Judicial Activism in the Equal
Protection Context: Democracy, Distrust, and Deconstruction, 73 Georgetown L.J. 89, 11314 (1984).
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gender qualify, but age and poverty do not. Pariah legislation is
typically directed at status rather than conduct, and often that
status is hereditary. While not identical to the question of immutability, these characteristics also focus on the extent to which the
targets of the legislation can control the trait that distinguishes
them from the rest of the population. But just as it overlaps imperfectly with Sunstein's caste principle, the pariah principle is
simultaneously broader and narrower than the idea of immutability. Status is not simply the possession of an immutable trait: it
is the labeling of a person based on who he is rather than what he
does. It carries with it echoes of pre-Enlightenment hierarchies
based on birth and parentage. Status need not be either immutable or hereditary. A child with a hideous defect, born of normal
parents, would once have been (and unfortunately might still be)
accorded pariah status; if surgery corrects the defect, the child's
status might change.
Another crucial difference distinguishes standard threetiered equal protection doctrine from the pariah principle. Conventional doctrine looks to the target group's general status in
society. If the Court determines that that status is too vulnerable-that is, that the group constitutes a discrete and insular minority-then all legislation intentionally disadvantaging the
group is subject to heightened scrutiny. The pariah principle, by
contrast, looks only to the particular legislation at issue to determine whether it creates or encourages pariah status. Thus under
conventional analysis, all intentional discrimination against people of color, however mild, is subject to strict scrutiny. Discrimination against left-handers, however, is acceptable under threetiered equal protection doctrine. It violates the Constitution only
if it makes them pariahs-and even after such legislation is invalidated, other discriminatory statutes are left untouched. In other
words, a determination that a particular statute violates the pariah principle does not convert the target group into a discrete
and insular minority.n
The pariah principle does not fit neatly within any of these
current ways of thinking about equal protection, but its family
77. Of course, if enough such statutes exist, that might show the group's vulnerabil·
ity to hostile legislation and thus provide some evidence for a conclusion that the group is
a discrete and insular minority. Nevertheless, there is a significant difference between
concluding that some people are, as a class, generally considered pariahs by society, and
concluding that a particular statute treats them as pariahs. The pariah principle is thus
broader than Carotene Products in that it is not limited to those generally disadvantaged
by our society, but it is also narrower in that it has nothing to say about run-of-the-mill
discriminatory legislation against even the most vulnerable groups.
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resemblance to them is no coincidence. Modern thinking about
equal protection centers around Brown, which means that Jim
Crow is the paradigm violation of the equal protection clause.
But there are many overlapping ways of conceptualizing the evils
of Jim Crow. Carolene Products centers around the political subordination of blacks in the old South; the anticaste principle focuses on their social and economic subordination; and the stigma
theory focuses on the racist ideology of inferiority. The pariah
principle focuses on the resemblances between their situation
and that of untouchable castes: the taboos based on their presumed inferiority that prohibited blacks from engaging freely in
many of the ordinary transactions of everyday life. Except for
Jim Crow, legislation giving credence to such taboos has been
rare in American society, which is why other ways of generalizing
from the rejection of Jim Crow have seemed more fruitful.
Apart from Jim Crow, such legislative judgments of inferiority
typically have been based on past conduct, which is why the bill
of attainder cases are closely allied with the pariah principle. Indeed, in a sense, Jim Crow might have been considered a bill of
attainder against blacks-except that the disabilities placed on
blacks were even worse than a bill of attainder in that they did
not even purport to be based on past misconduct, but instead on
inherent inferiority. Whether the badge of inferiority is a black
skin, or a yellow star, or a pink triangle, the pariah principle forbids the government from relegating any class of citizens to the
status of untouchables.
We doubt that Justice Scalia or other supporters of Amendment 2 would quarrel with this principle. They might well, however, question whether the principle has any application to the
much less dramatic situation before the Court in Romer. In the
next section we will explain why the Court correctly viewed
Amendment 2 as a violation of the pariah principle.
III.

APPLYING THE PARIAH PRINCIPLE

We turn then, to the question of how to determine whether a
law violates the pariah principle. In other words, what does it
mean to say that a particular law creates or sanctions outcasts? It
might help to begin with an example that does not trigger emotional or ideological responses. Some studies suggest that lefthanded people die earlier than right-handed people, and some
speculate that this might be due to greater involvement in vari-
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ous kinds of accidentsJs Suppose further research shows that
lefties indeed have automobile accidents at a significantly higher
rate. Under the usual form of minimal scrutiny, the legislature
would be permitted to curtail-or even to eliminate-driving
privileges for left-banders. Draconian as that step might be, it is
rationally related to the legitimate state interest of preventing accidents. A state would even have a rational basis for prohibiting
left-banders from marrying each other in order to prevent the
perpetuation of the genetic "defect."
But the government could not require left-banders to wear a
scarlet L: despite the likely insistence that such a law serves only
to warn others in order to avoid accidents, it is apparent that the
primary, if not the sole, purpose of such a law is to brand lefties
as outcasts.79 This is what the Court meant in Romer when it
quoted Department of Agriculture v. Moreno to the effect that "'a
bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest."'so Notice that it is irrelevant that left-banders do not constitute a discrete and insular
minority or that choice of apparel is not a fundamental right.
Beyond the scarlet L, the analysis becomes more difficult. It
is clearly not caste legislation for the government, knowing that
many people hate or fear left-banders (viewing them as sinister
or at least as gauche), to refuse to enact legislation protecting
them from private discrimination. The government may even
contribute to the discriminatory atmosphere in some ways, as, for
example, if public schools force left-handed children to write
with their right hands. (There are generations of lefties who will
testify that this is unlikely to be a particularly successful strategy:
all it produces is people who can't write well with either hand.)
The government might exclude left-banders from the military because of their accident rate or to simplify training and equipment
78. See Stanley Coren, Age Trends in Handedness: Evidence for Historical Changes
in Social Pressure on the Writing Hand?, 91. Social Behavior and Personality 369 (1994);
John P. Aggleton, Robert W. Kentridge, and Nicholas J. Neave, Evidence for Longevity
Differences Between Left Handed and Right Handed Men: An Archival Study of Cricketers, 47 J. Epidemiology and Community Health 206 (1993). See generally, John J. Sciortino. Sinistral Legal Studies, 44 Syracuse L. Rev. 1103 (1993). Although we are both righthanded, we should note that our selection of this example should not be considered evidence of animosity toward lefties. Indeed, each of us has happily produced left-handed
progeny.
79. This should be true even leaving aside the possibility that such legislation might
violate the First Amendment by compelling speech. On the speech issue, see, e.g., Board
of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977);
Miami Herald Publishing Company v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
80. 116 S. Ct. at 1628, quoting Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,
534 (1973).
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procurement. Moreover, under the reasoning of such cases as
Maher v. Roe,s1 the government could presumably encourage
left-handers not to reproduce, or at least to reproduce only with
right-handed mates. And, as noted earlier, the government could
enact all sorts of restrictions on left-banders themselves.
Defining the precise circumstances under which such antisouthpaw legislation goes too far, and becomes caste legislation,
is tricky. Indeed, identifying legislation that violates the pariah
principle is better described as reasoning by analogy-determining how close the law is to the core case of the scarlet L-than as
applying a particular test.sz Thus it would be difficult to construct
a bright-line rule for distinguishing legitimate legislation from
caste legislation. Nevertheless, keeping in mind the paradigm
case, we can focus on some identifying factors. Caste legislation
sends a message that it is perfectly reasonable for someone to
avoid sitting near the pariah on a bus, or using the same drinking
fountain, or playing on the same baseball team. As Justice
Harlan noted, caste legislation proceeds on the ground that some
citizens "are so inferior and degraded that they cannot be allowed to sit in public coaches occupied" by other citizens.R3 It
also encourages ostracism; as the Court noted in Strauder v. West
Virginia, one problem with a statute forbidding blacks to sit on
juries was that it is "a stimulant to ... prejudice."84 Another
problem with caste legislation is that it suggests that the pariahs
as a group are inherently unequal and have core societal rights
only on sufferance. Finally, caste legislation tends to be directed
at status rather than conduct and to involve hereditary or quasihereditary traits. Justice Brennan condemned the Texas statute at
issue in Plyler in part because it "imposes a lifetime hardship on
a discrete class of children not accountable for their disabling status."Rs These are certainly core features of all of the examples
that began this section, as well as of the scarlet L. One way to
summarize our view of improper caste legislation would be to say
that such legislation condemns the sinner, as well as the sin.
The key question, of course, is whether Colorado's Amendment 2 is close enough to a scarlet L to violate the equal protection clause. The thrust of Justice Scalia's dissent is to argue that it
is not: he suggests that the law is not based on a "bare ... desire
81. 432 U.S. 464 (1977); See also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
82. See Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict (Oxford U. Press,
1996).
83. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 560 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
84. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879).
85. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982).

278

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 13:257

to harm," but is rather a run-of-the-mill "singl[ing] out for disfavorable treatment,"86 presumed to be constitutional unless irrational. Amendment 2, according to Scalia, does not even disfavor
homosexuals, but merely prohibits giving them special benefits; it
is, moreover, merely the manifestation of mild, and legitimate,
antipathy toward disfavored conduct. The appropriate analogy is
not to the scarlet L but to Bowers v. Hardwick,R? which allows
the state to criminalize homosexual conduct.
The majority opinion, while not fully satisfactory, contains
the seeds of a response based on the pariah principle. The majority is rightly suspicious of the unusual nature of the restrictions
imposed by Amendment 2: the Amendment "identifies persons
by a single trait and then denies them protection across the
board."ss Under what circumstances might it be rational to impose such broad disabilities on the basis of a single trait? Only if
the mere possession of that trait brands its bearer as less than a
full citizen. As Richard Epstein-no defender of antidiscrimination laws-has explained, society's general acceptance of antidiscrimination laws puts advocates of measures like Amendment 2
in the position of arguing that homosexuals deserve an exceptionally disfavored status:
[T]hey [advocates of Amendment 2] have to make it appear as
though they harbor special animus against the groups that
want to claim the protection of the antidiscrimination ordinance .... [P]roponents of the amendment must give long and
elaborate explanations as to why some groups are unworthy,
by some public standard, of a guarantee of the same level of
protection that is accorded to other groups .... The inability to
rely on freedom of association means that all refusals to associate have to be for cause, so that individuals and groups who
wish to be left alone now have to engage in the unhappy task
of group defamation in order to achieve that rather simple
end. The upshot is that the entire process sanctions a level of
antigay and antilesbian rhetoric that is better left unspoken in
public settings.R9

In fact, the problem is worse than Epstein realizes. Advocates of
Amendment 2 must not only explain why homosexuals are entitled to less protection than protected classes such as veterans, the
unmarried, and the elderly, all of whom are covered by Colorado
86. 116 S. Ct. at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
87. 478 u.s. 186 (1986).
88. 116 S. Ct. at 1628.
89. Richard A. Epstein, Caste and the Civil Rights Laws: From Jim Crow to SameSex Marriages, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 2456, 2472 (1994).
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civil rights law. They must also explain why, unlike any other
group in society, homosexuals should be permanently disbarred
from seeking such protection. The only apparent explanation for
this unique treatment is that discrimination against homosexuals
is desirable and therefore entitled to constitutional protection.9o
The Amendment also shares with other caste legislation the
fact that it penalizes a status. One need not engage in homosexual conduct to come within the purview of the Amendment: it
includes "[h]omosexual, [l]esbian, or [b]isexual [o]rientation"
and "relationships" (which could, in fact, be sexually chaste), in
addition to "conduct" and "practices." This focus on status is not
an accident. Homosexuals are hated not just for what they do but
for who they are, and thus anti-gay and anti-lesbian sentiment is
directed at status as well as conduct. As Judge Richard Posner
has observed, the "real horror of homosexuality" today, "for
those who feel it as horror, is the preference itself."9J It is the
inclination toward homosexuality, not particular sex acts-which
sometimes may be committed by someone with basically heterosexual inclinations-that is the basis for condemnation: "if you
(being male) say that you'd like to have sex with that nice-looking young man but of course will not because you are law-abiding, afraid of AIDS, or whatever, you will stand condemned in
the minds of many as a disgusting faggot. Homosexual acts are
punished in an effort, however futile, to destroy the inclination."92 This targeting of homosexuals for who they are is, as
noted earlier, one hallmark of pariah legislation.
To deprive a single class of the right to approach legislative
bodies for protection against discrimination serves not only to
demonize members of the class as unworthy of the respect of
other citizens. It also encourages private discrimination. It creates a specific constitutional right to discriminate, implying that
its targets deserve to be shunned. It sends a message that unlike
everyone else, homosexuals are not entitled to the ordinary pro90. Press reports indicate that the supporters of Amendment 2 engaged in a concerted effort to identify homosexuals with otherwise deviant lifestyles and with sexual
abuse of children. See Michael Booth, Gay-rights Amendment Fight Costly, Heated, Denver Post at B4 (Oct. 29, 1992); Michael Booth, Controversial Researcher Focus of Rights
Debate, Denver Post at 6A (Sept. 27, 1992); Suzanne B. Goldberg, Gay Rights Through
the Looking Glass: Politics, Morality and the Trial of Colorado's Amendment 2, 21 Fordham Urban L.J. 1057. 1069, 1073 (1994); Bella Stumbo. The State of Hate, 120 Esquire 73.
78, 81, 84 (Sept. 1993).
91. Richard A. Posner, Sex and Reason 232 (Harvard U. Press, 1992).
92. !d. at 233. Like Epstein, Posner is also skeptical about discrimination laws but
sees no basis for protecting other groups while excluding homosexuals: "Is there less, or
less harmful, or less irrational discrimination against homosexuals than against the members of any of these other groups? The answer is no." !d. at 323.
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tections of our legislative process. They are, in other words, citizens only on sufferance.
Nor does it matter that Amendment 2 does not mandate private discrimination. The Court in Romer disavowed the Colorado court's reliance on such cases as Reitman v. Mulkey93 and
Hunter v. Erickson,94 presumably because those cases involved
restrictions on racial anti-discrimination provisions. Nevertheless, both cases are similar to Romer in that they involved provisions making it difficult or impossible to enact antidiscrimination laws. In Reitman, California had enacted a constitutional amendment prohibiting the state legislature or any local
lawmaking body from limiting the right to sell or lease property
to any person, with the obvious effect of invalidating all existing
or future laws against housing discrimination. In Hunter, an
amendment to the Akron city charter required that housing discrimination ordinances, unlike all other local ordinances, had to
be approved in a citywide referendum. In invalidating these two
provisions, the Court held both that encouragement of private
racial discrimination can constitute state action susceptible to an
equal protection challenge and that a state provision constitutionalizing the right to discriminate is different from a mere repeal or refusal to enact anti-discrimination provisions.
Where Romer differs from Hunter and Reitman is that the
general type of discrimination-against homosexuals-is not itself prohibited by the equal protection clause as so far interpreted. The Court would not apply strict scrutiny to a state law
prohibiting same-sex marriage, for example. But the pariah principle eliminates this difference. Just as the state would be prohibited from requiring homosexuals to wear a pink triangle, it is
prohibited from deliberately encouraging private individuals to
treat homosexuals as pariahs or from constitutionalizing the right
to treat homosexuals as pariahs. (It is a nice question, not at issue
in Romer itself, whether mere symbolic encouragement without
the actual legal protection of the right to ostracize would be sufficient to invalidate state legislation.)
Notice that the pariah principle, as thus defined and applied,
is quite narrow, allowing a great deal of legislation that might be
considered discriminatory. By itself, it does not necessarily prevent the government from restricting gays and lesbians from
some occupations thought to involve peculiar dangers. Nor does
it prohibit legislation that has the incidental but unintentional ef93.
94.

387 U.S. 369 ( 1967).
393 U.S. 385 (1969).
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feet of keeping one identifiable group of people toward the bottom of the social and economic ladder.
The conflict between Amendment 2 and the pariah principle
remains unclear so long as we conceptualize it, as did the Colorado Supreme Court, as a limit on the ability to lobby for new
legislation of a specific kind. But a ban on legislation is
equivalent to the recognition of a constitutional right: to say that
Congress may pass no law abridging the freedom of speech is to
make free speech a constitutional right. Similarly, to say that the
legislature may pass no law protecting homosexuals from discrimination is to make discrimination against homosexuals a protected constitutional right. By singling out discrimination against
homosexuals for this special commendation by the state, Amendment 2 renders them a pariah class. It essentially places the right
to be free from economic or social contact with homosexuals on a
higher plane than the right to avoid members of any other group
in society. As the Romer Court said, such laws "raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity
toward the class of persons affected. "Ys
The pariah principle is not, however, implicated by other
forms of discrimination against homosexuals. One example is
the prohibition on gay marriage. To say that gay men cannot
marry each other is not to brand them as untouchables. On the
contrary, untouchables are only allowed to mate within their own
group. A rule that prohibited homosexuals from marrying heterosexuals would be more analogous to pariah status. Similarly,
the "don't ask, don't tell" policy for homosexuals in the military%
is quite contrary to a rule of untouchability. By pointedly tolerating closeted homosexuality, the policy in effect declares that
other soldiers have no valid complaint about association with
homosexuals; if the military considered homosexuals to be untouchables, it would either not allow them to serve at all, segregate them, or require them to announce their status so that
others could avoid unwanted association.97 This is not to say that
95. 116 S. Ct. at 1628. Even if not all of the supporters of Amendment 2 shared this
animus, they apparently believed that this particular form of animus is uniquely deserving
of accommodation by government.
96. 10 u.s.c. § 654(b) (1994).
97. See David Cole and William N. Eskridge. Jr., From Hand-Holding co Sodomy:
First Amendment Protection of Homosexual (Expressive) Conduct, 29 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L.
Rev. 319, 333 (1994) ("[a] 'don't ask, don't tell' policy makes sense only if homosexual
conduct and identity are not in themselves problematic: if they were, there would be no
basis for directing military officers not to ask about or investigate homosexuality.").
There is some dispute about whether the "don't ask. don't tell" policy is being implemented in a way that might implicate the pariah principle. See, e.g .. The Military and
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the ban on gay marriages and the current military policy are necessarily beyond constitutional reproach, but they do not offend
the pariah principle.
The boundaries of the pariah principle are to some extent
fuzzy, although Amendment 2 is well within them. The factors
noted above can combine in various ways to produce legislation
that looks more or less like the paradigm case of a scarlet L. In
close cases, there are likely to be disputes. For example, while
legislation prohibiting cigarette smoking in various places is not
caste legislation (it condemns the sin but not the sinner), there
might be greater question about a state constitutional amendment providing that employers, landlords, and the like are affirmatively permitted to discriminate against those who smoke.
Despite some misgivings, we would argue that this is not caste
legislation: first, it focuses on continuing conduct rather than immutable status, and, second, the health costs (for employers) and
likelihood of cheating, with its attendant costs (for both employers and landlords), provide plausible rationales for the law beyond mere hostility toward smokers.
Recent enactments that require convicted sex offenders to
register with the local police present an even closer question.
These laws also provide for public disclosure of the identity of
these individuals, even if the conviction was prior to the enactment of the disclosure law. It is this public disclosure that is
troublesome. By subjecting a single class of persons to this treatment, these laws-sometimes called "Megan's Law" after a New
Jersey girl who was raped and killed by a previously convicted
sex offender-signal to the public that members of the class are
so despicable that reasonable people should do everything they
can to avoid them. It seems very close to a scarlet L, especially
since once a person has joined the class (purely on the basis of
conduct, which may distinguish Romer). his status becomes permanent. On the other hand, a key feature of Colorado's Amendment 2 is that the disability imposed was so broad that the Court
could find no reason for it other than pure hostility. Megan's
Law may be justified as a prophylactic measure to allow individuals to protect themselves or their children from individuals who
present a particularly grave risk of harm. Nevertheless, this rationale arguably might not be sufficient to validate the law. Contrary to popular myth, it is not at all clear that sex offenses are
Gays: Still Asking, 290 Harper's Magazine 18 (June 1995); Robert Lamme, Dazed in che
Milicary, Advocate 43 (Jan. 24, 1995).
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more likely than other offenses to be the subject of recidivism.9R
Moreover, the group in question is generally despised by society,
so it is not unlikely that the legislation will (not accidentally) trigger additional social sanctions against members of the group.
The courts are already struggling with the question whether
Megan's Law is a bill of attainder (or for similar reasons, an ex
post facto law).99 The question of whether it violates the pariah
principle is difficult for similar reasons, and may turn on the extent to which the detailed drafting and implementation of the law
give credence to the purported remedial purpose.wo
Now that we have (we hope) clarified the pariah principle, it
may be useful to compare it with its closest doctrinal cousins.
One is the bill of attainder clause. Like the pariah principle, the
bill of attainder clause limits the legislature's ability to impose
disabilities on groups. The major difference is that the attainder
cases turn on whether a disability is properly termed a ''punishment," whereas the pariah principle focuses on group exclusions
from participation in civil society, a category that overlaps with
punishment but is nevertheless distinct. Similarly, the pariah
principle has a focus different than that of the Cleburne and Plyler line of equal protection cases. There are two significant differences. First, the way we have articulated the principle is
somewhat different from Cleburne's amorphous concern with
malignant legislative intent or Plyler's somewhat forced effort to
draw support from suspect class and fundamental rights theories.
Second, we do not find it particularly helpful to divide the analysis between a list of triggering characteristics and an ends-means
review. Traditional equal protection doctrine conceptualizes
levels of scrutiny as meaning that certain kinds of legislation
need a better justification than others. We would prefer to say
that certain kinds of legislation are impermissible, but that one
factor in determining whether a law falls within this category is
whether it has some plausible regulatory justification. Our approach has the advantage of not artificially dividing the inquiryand more importantly, of keeping firmly in mind that the ulti98. See Stephen J. Morse, Blame and Danger: An Essay on Preventil·e Detention, 76
B.U. L. Rev. 113, 139, 140-141 (1996).
99. See W.P. v. Poritz, 1996 W.L. 374036 (D.N.J. 1996); Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367
(N.J., 1995); Doe v. Pataki, 919 F. Supp. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Artway v. Attorney General,
876 F. Supp. 666 (D.N.J. 1995), rev'd on other grounds, 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996); Washington v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062 (Wash. 1994).
100. Notably, in the most thorough and thoughtful opinion upholding such legislation, the New Jersey Supreme Court was at some pains to construe the statute and the
administrative guidelines narrowly. Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 381-87 (limiting extent of
public notification and requiring prior judicial review).
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mate concern is not ensuring that laws are well-designed to
achieve their means, but preventing the legislature from treating
citizens as outcasts.
Despite these differences, there are obvious similarities between these various approaches. Indeed, the results in some of
the bill of attainder cases might well have been justified under
the pariah principle, since blocking a group from pursuing a
broad range of occupations is a clear indicator of pariah status.
Similarly, Plyler and Cleburne might have been argued as pariah
cases. In the modern world, exclusion from the public schools
might well be considered an expulsion from the right to participate in civil society, and in Plyler, that exclusion was based on
group characteristics beyond individual control. In Cleburne, being judged unfit to live in certain neighborhoods might well have
been considered a form of pariah treatment, particularly given
that the exclusion was based on status (mental retardation). In
short, as we remarked earlier, the pariah principle does have a
strong family resemblance to some important existing doctrines.
We regard this resemblance as a strength, not a disability.
CONCLUSION
The pariah principle is not likely to find broad application.
The reason is not that it is unimportant, but that it is so fundamental to our understanding of equality. Given the fundamental
place of the principle in our society's conception of equality, we
would not expect violations to be numerous or blatant. As a result, violations are likely to be sporadic; and when the principle is
invoked at all, the case will often be on the borderline. Thus, the
practical legal importance of the principle is limited. But the
Romer Court's recognition of this basic principle is nonetheless
important because it illuminates a neglected aspect of the constitutional guarantee of equality.
Romer predictably will be castigated as a result-oriented, ad
hoc decision, or a disingenuous sub rosa effort to adopt a higher
standard of judicial review. In our view, on the contrary, the
Court deserves credit for recognizing the unusual nature of the
case before it and the fundamental principle that was at stake.

